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Uncertainty of returns from marketing is an extremely important factor affecting the diffusion of 
a wide range of genetically modified (GM) crops worldwide. Biotech companies face 
complicated choices in making decisions about whether to enter agricultural markets in different 
countries with their agricultural products. In this paper, we model these choices as a real option 
problem of entry decision solved at a micro-level by individual firms. The model is aggregated in 
order to reflect the heterogeneity of different genetic events, as well as different markets, in 
terms of their profitability. The solution to the model produces distributions of entry probabilities 
as functions of the functional forms (and parameter values) that govern the evolution of 
stochastic returns from marketing. These proportions are then compared to the actual data on 
incidences of biotech firms entering foreign markets with different GM crops, and conclusions 
about the distribution of their patent values, evolution of returns, and efficiency of local IPR 
protection are drawn.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Genetically modified crops can be marketed in many countries. The biotech companies 
that hold stocks of patented genetically modified crops (genetic events) face the choice of 
entering these markets. Entering a particular market brings a flow of uncertain revenues (not 
necessarily positive), but is also associated with substantial entry costs. The costs of entry 
involve building the storage and retail capacities, getting approval and possibly local patent 
protection, and obtaining the producer acceptance and establishing customer loyalty via 
developing public relations and conducting advertising campaigns. Thus, before entering a 
particular foreign market, the owners of the rights to GM crops must weigh the costs and benefits 
of such a decision. This involves not only comparing the entry costs with the expected PV of the 
future returns, but also accounting for the option value of not entering the market, which should 
be significant given the uncertainties associated with bioengineered products. Not entering a 
market at any particular time gives a firm the benefit of waiting until new information arrives 
(i.e., new benefits or hazards of a GM crop may be discovered, the consumer acceptance may 
change, or a more viable GM crop may appear). The firm can then revise the expected values of 
costs and returns and thus make a more informed decision.  
The option value of delaying entry into particular markets is by no means negligible. The 
future safety and profitability of GM crops is highly uncertain - consider the notoriously 
inconclusive empirical research on the profitability of the Roundup-Ready soybeans and Bt corn 
in the US, not to mention the more controversial and less widespread genetic modifications 
introduced elsewhere, like those of rice or papaya. As is well known, an option value increases in 
both the volatility of the (returns from) underlying asset and time to expiration
1. When the 
uncertainty of the returns is significant and a firm believes that bits of information that will 
clarify the situation are to arrive in the near future, the option value of not entering a particular 
market presently may be large enough to cover the expected present returns from entering a 
market. This situation bears a striking resemblance to an American call option on a dividend 
paying stock or asset.
2 Exercising the option (effectively making a purchase) means acquisition 
of the stream of stochastic future returns, but giving up the opportunity not to exercise it. Not 
                                                 
1 However, the option value can never be greater than the value of the underlying asset. 
2 In the realm of real options, it is analogous to an option to defer investment.   3
exercising the option implies giving up the current dividends but preserving the option value. 
Entering a market is equivalent to exercising an option because it implies commitment in the 
form of the sunk costs of entry (i.e., getting regulatory approvals, obtaining customer and 
producer loyalty, establishing production capacities or licensing to local seed companies, etc.), 
which is equivalent to the exercise price, and becoming entitled to a stream of returns from 
marketing. An alternative way to specify the model would be to introduce compound options in 
the form of an additional option to abandon a market if it turns out to be unprofitable. For now, 
we do not explicitly consider the abandonment option in order to keep things less complicated 
and also because the precedents of pulling out of GM seed markets are rare and the costs of 
abandonment are unclear
3.  
In the model presented in this paper, we assume that the biotech companies will enter a 
particular market only if the expected discounted value of future net returns conditional on the 
information currently at their disposal is greater than the value of the option to delay marketing 
the product. An optimal sequential policy for the agent has the form of an optimal entry rule that 
determines whether to enter a market at time t depending on the information currently available, 
i.e., whether to incur the entry costs and secure a stream of uncertain returns. If the decision not 
to enter is taken, the agent is getting a net current profit of zero but keeps the option to wait until 
the next period, when new information becomes available that will refine the expectation of the 
future returns. On the aggregate level, the proportion of the products that enter a foreign market 
at any age t is the proportion that satisfies the entry criteria at this age but did not satisfy them at 
t-1. The entry proportion at each age is a function of the value of the model’s parameter vector, 
which consists mainly of the coefficients of the distribution functions that describe the 
heterogeneity of the initial product values and their evolution over time. The data provide the 
actual proportions of products that enter foreign markets. Loosely speaking, the problem is to 
determine the optimal entry rule and find the values of the model’s parameters that make the 
entry proportions implied (generated) by the model as close as possible to the actually observed 
ones.  
Formally, we are looking for specifying an discrete stochastic model of optimal entry 
(call it optimal commitment) in order to derive the implications of this model on aggregate 
                                                 
3 An additional complication of pulling out of a GM seed market is effectively giving up the property rights on the 
crop there: once a crop has been “diffused” but the market was abandoned, producers would be free to re-plant the 
GM seeds if it is privately profitable.    4
behavior and to estimate the model’s parameters using aggregate data on how many GM crops 
enter foreign markets each year. So far, the best approximation we found for this has been the 
GM crop approval data that contains the dates of different genetic events of particular crops 
being approved for environmental safety, food, feed, and marketing in different countries. While 
this may not be the best indicator of entering a foreign market, these are the most complete and 
detailed data we found so far. Our hypothesis is that, assuming that costs of entering a particular 
foreign market are approximately the same for a certain class of GM crops (or proportional to the 
market size), the timing and frequency of their approvals indicate their relative values (and 
therefore the distribution of these values). Most generally speaking, the sooner the crop enters a 
market after it is patented, the more valuable it is. The distribution of incidences of entry, 
together with economically justifiable assumptions about the distribution and evolution of 
stochastic returns from marketing, defines the distribution of relative values of different genetic 
events (GM crops). It should be noted that, without some “anchor” value, it is impossible to get 
the ordinal patent/GM crop values, but knowing their distribution, i.e., relative values, can also 
be of value. While this does not answer all the questions, these results help identify the 
proportion of the patents that actually cover the R&D expenses of biotech companies and shed 
light on the profitability of GM crops in different world regions. The difference of this model 
from the other R&D models is that it does not require information that is unavailable in the 
majority of cases. In addition, instead of deriving the results from making assumptions about the 
R&D production and cost functions, the model makes assumptions about the stochastic returns 
from marketing the R&D products (i.e., the processes that generate them). The correctness of 
these assumptions can be verified by comparing the samples generated by the model to the actual 
data. Besides, the model does not treat mere patent counts as indicators of R&D profitability – 
something that has been the “Achilles’ heel” of the R&D literature. If compared to a simple NPV 
rule of entering a foreign market, other things being equal, the real option model would predict 
relatively late entry into different markets, particularly in the early stages of product lives when 
information is scarce. Later on, however, the real option model would predict a higher proportion 
of entries, particularly as patents approach their expiration dates. 
In the analysis of patent values, the discrete choice optimal stochastic control models 
have only been used in the analysis of optimal patent renewal data and applied to the countries   5
where the obligatory patent  renewal rules exist (i.e., Germany, France, and the Norway)
4. Under 
the patent renewal rule mechanism, a patentee has to pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep 
the patent in force. Knowledge of the renewal fee schedules and having very extensive aggregate 
data on all patent cohorts (by year of patenting) in a country makes the task of evaluating the 
distribution and average magnitude of patent values quite accomplishable. In particular, the 
simulations performed by Pakes (1986) showed a very close fit to the actual aggregate data on 
French and German patent renewal behavior and highlighted the differences between the two 
countries (i.e., patent offices’ claim approval behavior and the intensity with which the inventors 
explore the marketability of their products). Similar models have also been used in dealing with 
other issues, such as job matching, sequential binary choice models for birth sequences of 
married women, etc. It should be mentioned that, though the discrete optimal stochastic control 
techniques have a wide range of applications and provide rich interpretation of data, they share 
one common disadvantage. Both the estimation technique and the simulation/estimation results 
heavily depend on the details of the stochastic specification and, because of the complexity of the 
estimation problem, it is difficult to determine the robustness of the conclusions to the stochastic 
assumptions chosen. The only way to offset this shortcoming is to be very careful and informed 
in the model’s construction, so that the specifications are as close to economic reality (are as 
economically justified) as possible.  
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
The model that we use employs the Markov assumption, namely it assumes that the distribution 
of the next period’s return conditional on current information depends only on current returns 
and the parameters of the problem. The model is essentially a search model: each year the firms 
that hold patents on GM crops gather information about their economic viability in different 
countries (or world regions) and explore the ways in which these crops can benefit the producers 
and/or consumers. Three outcomes of this search are possible: one is that this search does not 
provide any new information; another is that the crops can never be profitably exploited, and yet 
another one is that information is uncovered indicating that the returns will increase in 
subsequent years. The conditional distribution of outcomes, should they occur, is non-stationary 
                                                 
4 See Pakes (1986), Schankerman (1984), Pakes and Schankerman (1994), Lanjouw (1996, 1998).     6
over time, which allows for the possibility that the patent holders explore the most promising 
alternatives first. In addition, we assume that patent protection is finite (i.e., that there is a 
statutory limit to patent lives), so that the model has a finite horizon.  
  Given these assumptions, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution for the optimal entry 
rule as a function of the parameters of the Markov process and the age of the patent, which 
should simplify estimation of the real-life aggregate data. On the other hand, the model presents 
some difficulties with respect to calculation of aggregate entry probabilities. To allow for 
heterogeneity, we assume that there is a distribution of initial returns among patents, which is 
modified over time as the agents uncover more profitable ways of exploiting their patented ideas. 
The distribution of returns at each age does not have an analytic form and, therefore, neither do 
the entry probabilities. (Pakes uses a simulated frequency approach).  Below is a formal 
description of the discrete choice optimal stochastic control model of market entry.  
  A biotech firm has N patents on GM crops (genetic events of particular crops). There are 
many firms (several actually), but this is irrelevant to the model, as it is not about competition. 
Each crop is protected by a patent of length L (the patent can be broader than just one event, in 
which case several crops are protected by the same patent). The firm is deciding whether to enter 
a new market with each of the products (possibly a market in a foreign country). The returns 
from marketing in this country (rt) evolve according to a stochastic process (details later), and 
entering the market requires a considerable one-time sunk cost, C (related to capacity building, 
getting approvals, customer loyalty, producer acceptance, etc.). One can assume that the entry 
cost is declining due to the gradual lowering of the regulatory barriers and increasing consumer 
and producer acceptance.  
The situation is very similar to an American call option: the firm has an option to “buy” 
marketing its new product in a foreign country at the price of the sunk entry cost (Ct). The 
option’s maturity is L, and the time to expiration is L-t. The value of the option to enter the 
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The first term in the brackets is effectively the option value: it shows what the firm gets if it 
decides not to enter the foreign market, i.e. the discounted value of the patent in the next period.
5 
The second term is what the firm gets if it decides to exercise the option at t and enters the 
foreign market. In this case, it gets a PV of the flow of per period returns until the patent’s 
expiration, rt+i ( L i , 0 = -t) conditional on the current information,  t Ω , minus the sunk entry costs, 
Ct.
6   
Given the distributional assumptions about the returns are specified, equation (*) can be 
solved recursively for two variables: cutoff values  t r  and proportions of products entering the 
market  t π . For each t, there exists a unique return (cutoff value),  t r , such that the option is 
exercised (entry occurs) if the actual current return rt>  t r . Alternatively, the option is not 
exercised if  t t r r < . Knowing the cutoff values ( t r ’s as functions of the distributional parameters 
and t) permits calculation of the shares of patented products (call them different GM crops), 
t π ’s, that will be marketed at each t.  
Given the availability of empirical data on the number of GM crops that enter markets in 
different countries over several years, the simulation results can be compared to the actual 
proportions in several ways and conclusions drawn.  
Below we suggest the distributional assumptions of the model and try to justify them on 
empirical grounds. 
-  When the invention is made (i.e., the option appears), we have a known initial returns 
distribution. The initial returns (r1) are lognormally distributed with a mean of µ  and 
variance  R σ : 
) , ( ~ ) log( 1 R r σ µ η .          ( 1 )  
This distribution is properly skewed, which reflects the fact that the bulk of the 
innovations (genetic events) are not as profitable as the few that lie on the far right.  
-  The evolution of the returns is a Markov process (this goes without saying ☺). The 
information set  t Ω  thus consists of the current return, rt, and the current time, t. The 
conditional distribution of  1 + t r  is:  
                                                 
5 Note that the option value is non-negative, even the future returns turn out to be negative. 
6 A possible extension is to introduce another option – an abandonment option of exiting the market after entering if 
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t , for t=1,…, L-1. 
In addition,  1 ≤ δ  and   1 ≤ φ . 
This process has the following economic interpretation. At each age, patent holders (biotech 
firms) gather information on and explore the ways of improving their crops marketability and 
safety in order to increase the profits. Three outcomes of this process are possible:  
1)  It is found that the crop can never be profitably exploited (something quite common 
among GM crops). This event occurs with probability  ) exp( t r θ −  - note that it occurs with 
smaller probability the larger are the current (estimated) returns from marketing the 
product,  t r . In this case, the product never enters the market (technically, 0 is an 
absorbing state, as  1 ) 0 | exp( = = − t t r r θ ) and a single realization of zero return is an 
absorbing state. The option value on this product is zero as well.  
2)  No new information discovered, this search does not provide any new information, in 
which case the current returns decay at the rate of  1 ≤ δ , which can be attributed to 
obsolescence due to arrival of better substitutes (as an illustration, consider the number of 
patented herbicide resistant versions of soybeans and cotton). In this case, entry is not 
likely, but a decrease in the entry costs may still trigger it.  
3)  Information is uncovered indicating that the returns will differ from the returns expected 
before the new information became available (say, the environmental safety concerns 
have been raised or lowered, IPR protection has been improved or worsened, or the 
producers have recognized or rejected the convenience of growing a crop). The new 
return depends on the precise realization of z, which is specified as a random variable 
with a two parameter exponential distribution. z is greater than zero with probability 
) / exp( t σ γ −  (new information does not necessarily indicate positive returns – consider 
the Taco Bell Bt corn incident) and density that declines at a constant rate  t σ  thereafter. 
0 ≤ φ  allows for the possibility that the probability of the returns will increase declines   9
over time, or for the possibility that the patentees lay their hands on the most relevant and 
important information first.  
 
The stochastic process above generates the distribution of r2, r3, ... from the original distribution 
of r1 (defined by the parameters µ  and  R σ ) and the parameters  ) , , , , ( φ δ σ γ θ .  
This process a solution for the sequence of the cutoff values that determine the entry decision, 
{}
L
t t r 1 = , as a function of the parameters of the model. The distribution of the initial returns, the 
stochastic process generating the subsequent returns, and the entry tule defined by the sequence 
of cutoff values determine the unconditional distribution of returns at each age that depends only 
on the parameters of the model,  
[] 1 1 2 2 1 1 , ,..., , Pr ) , ( 1 r r r r r r r r t r F t t t ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ = − − − .  
The proportion of GM patent holders who enter at age t is the proportion with current returns 
above  t r , but with the previous period returns below  1 − t r , which can be written as 
) 1 , ( ) , ( 1 − − = − t r F t r F t t t π .  
t π  thus also depends only on the vector of the parameters of the model (i.e., by 
w= ) , , , , , , ( φ δ σ γ σ µ θ R ).  
With these definitions, the likelihood of a particular value of the parameter vector conditional on 
the actual (observed) data is  
∑∑ =
jt
w t j t j n w l )) , , ( log( ) , ( ) ( π ,  
where  n(j,t)  denotes the number of approvals of patents granted at time j and t years after 
patenting.  
  The distributional specifications for the stochastic returns are by no means final – these 
were chosen as most economically and empirically justifiable given the industry facts we have at 
the moment. Different distributional specifications are certainly possible (including continuous 
ones) and should be favored if they are considered to reflect the actual situation in the GM crop 
markets better (one suggestion would be to make the entry costs stochastic but with a declining 
mean). We would like to point out once more that the distributional specifications for the 
stochastic returns and there evolution are essential for this model, and probably are even more 
important than the parameter values. The reason is that it is these specifications, together with   10
the parameter values, that give rise to particular patterns of entry that should be compared to 
their real life counterparts, so in effect one must test the validity of the functional forms as well 
as their parameters. The need to be as flexible as possible in the distributional assumptions also 
explains why the model is solved numerically. 
This model can be solved recursively using numerical methods. The simplest way to 
proceed is to generate the population of the initial returns and their evolution over time (using 
either repeated Monte Carlo sampling or better Gaussian quadrature nodes). Then, the program 
should solve the problem recursively, starting at the terminal (patent expiration) date, for 
whether entry is optimal for a given current realization of r.
7 The solution is a sequence of the 
cutoff values, {}
L
t t r 1 = , that specify whether a firm should enter given it gets a return rt (i.e., enter if 
t t r r ≥  and do not if otherwise). This sequence then determines the entry proportions for each 
age, {}
L
t t 1 ) ( = π , all being dependent on the parameters (and functional specifications) only.  
The maximum likelihood estimation of the parameter vector w from the actual entry data 
is more computationally burdensome, as it requires the use of nested fixed point estimation. 
However, Matlab routines for similar problems have been are available and would require but a 









                                                 
7 If this problem is to have a real real options setup (contingent claims analysis), there is a potential issue of finding 
the right twin security (i.e., with perfectly correlated returns) that would be used to determine the required rate of 
return. This rate of return is then used to derive the so-called adjusted risk-neutral probabilities, defined as p=[(1+r)-
d]/(u-d) in the real options literature, that allow expected values to be discounted at the risk-free rate. This eliminates 
the common mistake of comparing projects with flexibility to the “naked” projects that allow for no flexibility. In 
the absence of such a twin security, one can derive the required rate of return by assuming that risk of entering a 
particular market is a function of average market risks. Otherwise, one must use actual probabilities of future 
returns, and problem becomes more like a decision tree analysis (DTA), which is basically equivalent to the real 
options but leads to overestimation of the option value.  
   11
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
In search for the data that would most adequately reflect the decisions of biotech 
companies to enter foreign and domestic markets with particular patented genetic events (GM 
crops), we did not find any sources that would provide the exact identifiable market entry dates. 
In fact, an entry into a market is not a one-time event, as it takes time to establish capacities, 
contract retailers, get approvals, and otherwise prepare the ground. However, there might be 
certain events that are likely to indicate that the entry commitment has been made (i.e., the 
option has been exercised).  
One of such events is getting a GM crop approved for production and/or consumption in 
a certain country. A particular significance of an approval comes from the fact that we are 
dealing with genetically engineered food/feed, hence the thoroughness with which every 
marketable genetic event is examined before granting it an approval. Had the subject of approval 
been less controversial, the approval procedure would be of much less significance, but the GM 
crops have been considered unsafe for consumption and unpredictably dangerous to the 
environment for long enough to warrant special attention.  
There is significant evidence that suggests that the process of approval of GM crops 
and/or food in any particular country is both costly and lengthy (perhaps, with the exception of 
the US and particularly Canada). It usually takes up to several years to get a crop (event) 
approved, and the approval process demands constant attention and injection of resources on 
behalf of the applicant. It is hard to imagine that dealing with other aspects of entry can take that 
long. Thus, while an approval date can certainly be a noisy indicator of entry date we, for now, 
assume that this particular event is coincidental with entry.  
The data we use comes from a Canadian non-profit initiative called Essential Biosafety  
(which is currently funded primarily by the Monsanto company). The purpose of the initiative is 
to provide “information resource and educational tool to meet the needs of scientists, regulatory 
personnel, policy makers, and others interested in the environmental and food safety of GM 
plants”. The Essential Biosafety webpage gives access to a comprehensive, veritable, and 
constantly updated GM crop database that contains precisely the newest and quite detailed 
information on all the existing events ( i.e.,  traits infused into/imposed on certain crops via   12
genetic modification). In particular, the database provides data on the approval of all these events 
in different countries. Unfortunately, these data do not contain any other economic indicators 
(which probably is symptomatic of the general lack thereof).  
A cursory examination of the data on GM crops that have been developed so far reveals that, 
to date, 78 events of 17 crops have been patented. The most widely “genetically altered” crops 
are: 
-  corn (maize): 22 events, 9 of which provide resistance to a European Corn borer, 19 
provide resistance to various herbicides, and one is resistant to the corn root worm (some 
events actually give combined pest/herbicide resistance). 
-  Argentine Canola: 15 events, 12 of which are herbicide tolerant, and the rest have 
modified seed fatty acid content and male sterility.  
-  Soybean: 7 events altogether, 5 of which have herbicide tolerance, and 2 have modified 
seed fatty acid content.  
-  Cotton: 7 events, 3 of which provide pest resistance, and 5 herbicide resistance.
 8 
The rest of GM crops include carnation (3), chicory (1), flax/linseed (1), melon (1), papaya 
(1), polish canola (2), potato (4), rice (2), squash (2), sugar beet (2), tobacco (1), tomato (6), and 
wheat (1).
9 The main crop developers are Aventis Cropscience, Du Pont, Monsanto, Syngenta 
Seeds, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., and Astra-Zeneca. 
The approval time-span encompasses the years 1994 through 2002. Unfortunately, the 
database does not contain the patenting dates, so we gathered the dates of patenting from 
elsewhere. In cases where the patenting dates were not available, we assumed them to be 
coincidental with the date of first approval, which always happened in the US, so that there is a 
high chance that the approval and patenting indeed happened at the same time. It should be 
mentioned that there are different types of approval listed in the data set: environmental, food, 
feed, and marketing. Unfortunately, the marketing approval was granted only to a negligible 
fraction of events, and there is no detailed explanation what these different types of approvals 
actually mean. We thus consider an event to be approved if it receives both environmental and 
food and/or feed approvals. 
                                                 
8 It is a pity that the authors do not have expertise in molecular biology and agronomy to judge on the relative merits 
of these events. 
9 It is probably indicative the prevailing herbicide tolerant trait is that that of glyphosate tolerance – something 
pioneered and proven popular by the RR soybeans has been attempted in many other plants.   13
Ideally, we would like to have data rich enough to define a pattern of entry for every country 
and, most importantly, for every patent cohort (i.e., the group of patents granted at the same 
time). However, though currently there exist as many 78 approved events, they are scattered 
among countries, so there is not enough data for a proper econometric analysis.
10 We thus resort 
to examination of worldwide and regional approval data (which by assumption identifies entry) 
and, for now, consider frequencies of approvals rather than their proportions.  
Table 1 contains the number of approvals by country and by time measured by the number of 
years since the event’s patenting.
11 Clearly, the US and Canada have a great lead in the number 
of approvals, which should be attributed mainly to the fact that all the common obstacles to GM 
crop introduction are much less severe there.
12 In particular, the entry costs there are likely to be 
very small in comparison to the expected returns. The regulatory approval is likely to take less 
time and resources, and the respect for intellectual property rights on patented innovations is 
much more pronounced in these countries (i.e., there is virtually no uncontrolled diffusion by 
illegally replanting GM seeds without paying for them). In addition, consumer attitudes are more 
accommodating, and producers are more receptive to agricultural innovations. But, most 
importantly, there is much less uncertainty of the returns from marketing the GM crops, and 
therefore the value of the option to defer entry is not as large as elsewhere, hence the early 
approval. On the other hand, it is precisely the ease of approval that might make the data on 
countries like US and Canada less meaningful in the context of our model in the sense that 
approval there is less likely to imply entry.  
These concerns aside, the entry proportions approximated by the national approval data give 
rise to some interesting observations. Figure 1 shows the frequency of approvals worldwide 
plotted against the time in between patenting and approval of an event. This time reflects how 
long a patentee waited after he effectively acquired an option to enter a (foreign) market before 




                                                 
10 The overwhelming majority of approvals still happen in the US and Canada. 
11 The economic rationale behind our reasoning justifies measuring approval/entry dates only by the time since 
patenting and not by the calendar time.  
12 We were surprised to see the only GM trait of papaya (nutrient enhancement) being approved for environment and 




(years after patenting)  0  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 
COUNTRY         
Argentina     23   11    7
Australia  1 1 1 3 3 6 3 1 1  20
Brazil       1      1
Canada  16 18 11 4 3     1    53
China     1        1
Czech Republic          1     1
European Union    1  5 3       9
Japan  2 10 15 2 2 1 2     34
Korea         3    3
Mexico     2 1       3
Netherlands     2        2
Philippines         1    1
Russia        1     1
South Africa   1  1        1   3
Switzerland     2  1     3
United Kingdom            0
United States  33  14  5 2    1    55
Uruguay       1      1
TOTAL  52  45  47 18 11 9 11 4  1  198
 
Clearly, there is a downward trend in the approval frequency, indicating that most of the 
events (genetic modifications of crops) occur soon after patenting. However, the figure does not 
indicate immediate approval and market entry (except for the US and Canada).
13 The approvals 
happening some time after an opportunity to enter markets appears is indicative of an positive 
option value of this opportunity (a call-like option to defer investment). In other words, there is 
uncertainty in the markets for GM crops, and therefore any flexibility in decision making 
presents economic agents with a non-negative option value (the right but not the obligation) and 
makes many of them wait for new information to arrive in order to be able to estimate the 
                                                 
13 While getting an approval might not necessarily mean entry, an entry into a market definitely implies an approval 
(i.e., an approval is a necessary condition for entry).    15
expected returns more precisely and make better decisions. Generally speaking, had there been 
no uncertainty, the agents would make a decision either to enter immediately or never to enter. 
Another consistency with the real options approach shows up in the fact that, though the 
frequency of approvals declines with the patent age (which can be attributed to declining returns 
due to substitution and other obsolescence effects and because of declining entry costs), the 
decline is significantly less steep (more gradual) at later ages. This is because, as the patents’ 
time to expiration declines, so does the option value, which provide an additional incentive to 
enter. 
 
Figure 1.  












While we do not have exact information on the length of the patents that protect these genetic 
events (many are patented in different countries), it is comparable with the time span in Figure 1. 
The downward trend is much less noticeable in the early ages of the patent lives. As a matter of 
fact, approvals peak again around the patent age of 2, which most likely accounts for many 
patent holders being willing to defer entry (note that there is no universal exogenous influence - 
the frequencies show approvals at the same patent age, not at the same calendar time).  
Our observations can be refined in two ways:  
-  One is by eliminating the US and Canadian approvals from the sample as they are less 
likely to indicate entry because of the relatively trouble-free approval. Figure 2 below   16
shows the predictable result: only the second peak in approvals remains around the age of 
2 years, since which the number of approvals decline.  
-  The other is by dividing the world into two regions represented by industrialized and 
developing countries.
14 Assuming (rightfully) that the influences within the two regions 
are similar yet there are significant differences between the two, and that the entry costs 
are proportionate to the size of the market, such division should highlight the differences 
in uncertainty of the returns and thus in the value of the patents between the two regions. 
Arbitrarily assigning Argentina, Brazil, China (?), Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South 
Africa, and Uruguay to the second region and the rest to the first, we get the following 
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It is obvious from the figure 3 that, while in the industrialized countries most of the events 
get approved soon after patenting, the overwhelming majority of approvals occurs just above age 
2. On the one hand, this might be indicative of the fact that it takes relatively longer to get a crop 
approved in the developing countries, which is not a good guess because approval is probably 
more difficult and lengthy in countries like EU and Japan. On the other, the difference in patterns 
in figures 3.A and 3.B might signify that  
                                                 
14 The word industrialized applies to agriculture as well. 
15 Other refinements of the current data are possible, like adjusting the size of agricultural markets or omitting the 
less popular crops.    17
1)  the volatility of the returns (parameters σ  and σ R in the model) is higher in the 
developing world; 
2)  the probability of discovering that an event cannot be marketed at all (negatively related 
to parameter θ  in the model) is also higher in the developing world, which results in high 
value of the option to defer entry, hence the pattern.  
3)  the depreciation/obsolescence rate of introduced genetic events (parameters δ and φ  in 
the model) in the industrialized world is higher due to substitution.  
And, again, the difference between the decline in the approval frequency immediately after the 
peak and closer to patent expiration is more pronounced in the developing world. As we argued 
above, this reflects a higher option value due to greater uncertainty.  
 
Figure 3. A. 












The simulation results from the model described in the paper confirm the above 
observations. As the results are preliminary, for the time being, we do not provide any plots or 
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Figure 3. B. 













Comparison of the simulation results of the stochastic model to those of its deterministic 
counterpart show that entry occurs earlier if the returns are perfectly predictable – there is no 
option value to entry deferral to forego. This result is obvious but illustrative.  
 
The mean of the entry probability distribution (equivalent to entry frequency in case of 
multiple firms and markets) shifts to the right with an increase in the volatility of both the initial 
or subsequent distribution of the returns from marketing, which implies that the option value 
becomes more significant and entry in the early ages is less likely. In particular, the right tail of 
the distribution becomes thicker in response to an increase in the parameter σ , which defines 
volatility of the truly random component of the returns, z. Similar transformation is observed in 
Stochastic
Deterministic 






initial returns   19
response to a decrease in θ , i.e., to lower probability of suddenly finding out that the event has 
no market value.  
  Sensitivity of the preliminary simulation results to the changes in the “trend” parameters 
is quite predictable. An increase in the depreciation rate δ , as well as a decrease in φ  (increase 
in the “depreciation” and the volatility of the random variable z that can sometimes lead to 
appreciation of the returns), lead to earlier entry, and thin the right tail of the distribution. 
Finally, a faster decline in the entry costs shifts the distribution to the left in an almost linear 
fashion, which warrants a possible modification to the model: specifying a stochastic process for 




  Even with the currently available data, it is possible to make some interesting conclusions 
by comparing our observations to the preliminary simulation results obtained from the model.  
The distribution of incidences of market entry is indicative of the heterogeneity of the 
values of GM crops (patented genetic events). Roughly speaking, the flatter this distribution, the 
more heterogeneous the patent values are. A part of this heterogeneity is attributed to 
heterogeneous profitability of the crops/events themselves and the other part accounts for the 
differences in the profitability of the markets where the entries occur. The insufficient volume of 
the currently available data prevents us from separating these two effects perfectly. However, the 
differences between the frequencies/proportions of entry in the industrialized and developed 
countries show that an average value of a GM event is lower and heterogeneity of the values is 
higher in the latter. This confirms the well-known facts about poor intellectual property rights 
enforcement in the developing world, as well as high entry costs there, which prevent biotech 
companies from entering those markets. There has been a lot of controversy about whether GM 
crops actually benefit the developing countries or harm them in the way the “green revolution” 
arguably did, but it appears that many of the genetic events can potentially be more beneficial to 
the developing countries than to the industrialized ones, at least in the short run (in particular the 
crops with enhanced nutrient content). So far, the data analyzed in the light of out model suggest 
that biotech companies recoup most of their R&D expenses (and earn most of the profits) from 
marketing their agricultural products in the industrialized part of the world, despite the   20
sometimes strong consumer and government opposition. However, at the current stage of the 
research, it is hard to determine what proportion of patents (read inventions) accounts for the 
bulk of the profits from the R&D activities. More extensive simulation exercises and data 
estimation will shed light on this matter.
16 
Overall, the sensitivity analysis of our preliminary simulation results suggests that the 
option value of deferring entry (the option value of patents on crop genetic events) is higher in 
the developing countries. High volatility of the returns from marketing GM crops makes 
biotechnology firms delay entry into foreign markets in order to obtain more information on the 
prospects there. (Of course, the higher option value does not compensate for the difference from 
the value in the industrialized world; it only partially offsets the unfavorable influences present 
in the developing world.) In particular, the results suggest that the probability that marketing a 
GM crop will bring zero profits, and the volatility of the returns evolution, are both higher in the 
developing countries. However, the returns from marketing GM crops in the third world do not 
decay at as high a rate as in the industrialized countries, possibly due to higher arrival rate of 
substitutes in the latter – something that also partially offsets the disadvantages of marketing 
there.  
At present, we continue working on both the model and data collection. In particular, we 
are looking for distributional assumptions that would describe the real-life situation better and 
forward to estimating the data with the maximum likelihood method.  
                                                 
16 Though the industry facts and adoption volumes suggest that most profits have been earned from selling 
glyphosate resistant soybeans and Bt corn to the farmers.    21
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